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INTRODUCTION: ‘WHY BOTHER READING ANOTHER PHILOSOPHICAL ARTICLE 
ON IMMIGRATION?’ 
 
This article is another theoretical account of immigration among the many 
philosophical contributions that have appeared over the last twenty years.1 Most of 
them have already adequately exhausted the major arguments involved in the ethics 
of migration. More importantly, political philosophy seems to have little impact on 
improving immigration policies. So why bother reading this article as it is unlikely to 
provide new insights or change anything? This article, rather pretentiously, claims 
that there are at least two opportunities for change that to date have remained 
practically unexplored. First, the legal foundations of current policies have been 
insufficiently challenged by theorists from the perspective of the law. Second, 
theorists have concentrated primarily on identifying good (practical) reasons for the 
admission and exclusion of aliens in general. They have not spent much concrete 
thinking in how to effectively involve aliens in order to respond to those practical 
                                            
1 See for an overview of the main arguments and bibliographical data: Veit Bader, Ethics of 
Immigration, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 331 (2005); Michael Blake, Immigration, A COMPANION TO 
APPLIED ETHICS 224 (2003); PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION. LIBERAL POLITICAL 
THEORY AND IMMIGRATION (2000); Chandran Kukathas, Immigration, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PRACTICAL ETHICS 567 (2003); Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, Migration Without Borders: 
An Investigation Into Free Movement of People, 27 GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSPECTIVES 1 (2005); 
Jonathan Seglow, The Ethics of Migration, 3 POLITICAL STUDIES REVIEW 317 (2005); Berry Tholen, 
The Europeanisation of Migration Policy - the Normative Issues, 6 E.J.M.L. 323 (2004). 
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reasons.2 The failure to come up with legal challenges has strengthened the 
practice and belief among officials that current admission laws are unproblematic 
from the legal perspective. The insufficient focus on voice of the alien has fostered 
the practice of unilateral immigration policies that do not seek to involve the affected 
aliens. By contrast, this article shall explore the two opportunities for change. 
Sections I and II propose two examples of how to challenge legally current 
admission practices. Section III tries to find out how to render the scholarship on 
ethics of migration more productive in a practical sense. I will argue that rather than 
producing reasons for adopting a particular openness or closure of borders, political 
theory can provide reasons for adopting a new default framework for discussing, 
negotiating and determining particular levels of openness.3 The default position is to 
be set in favor of aliens: their admission is the normal case and the exception, i.e. 
exclusion, will need extra justification.4 I will propose some guidelines for how to 
make this justification framework effective. Ultimately, this article seeks to urge 
political and legal theorists to come up with proposals for concrete institutional 
arrangements that will improve our current admission practices. 
 
I. FIRST EXAMPLE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT: EXCLUSION IS NOT INHERENT IN 
SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
1. The Problem: States do Not Justify the Exclusion of Aliens 
 
This article starts from the almost trivial observation of the current admission practices: 
when denying aliens admission to their territory, states do not substantially justify the 
exclusion vis-à-vis the excluded aliens. The lack of justification is evidenced by the 
extremely limited legal and institutional possibilities for challenging the exclusion. First, the 
review of exclusion measures is restricted to a legality test. This includes checking the 
satisfaction of the formal legal requirements (e.g. competence of the particular agency, 
deadlines, etc.), and the factual fulfillment of the statutory conditions for exclusion (or 
absence of fulfillment of the conditions for admission). But this does not include a 
proportionality test. In other words, a disproportionate exclusion is lawful as long as it passes 
                                            
2 Some authors offered insightful views on giving voice to aliens. But either these accounts are too 
hypothetical and abstract (BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)), or 
they focus primarily on giving voice to aliens already residing in the territory (legally or illegally) 
(SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996); SEYLA 
BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS (2004)). 
3 This is very similar to Phillip Cole’s position in this issue. But I am not sure that granting free 
movement the status of a fundamental right is the most expedient route. 
4 Michael Blake argues in this issue for the opposite default position: “individuals have to make some 
sort of showing before they can be understood to have a right to emigrate” – or immigrate for that 
matter. However, Blake concedes that “in a world as riven with injustice as our own … such a 
showing will not be difficult to make”. 
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the legality test. In addition, especially when concerns for public order are at stake, the 
appreciation of the facts is left almost entirely to the immigration officials. Secondly, though 
states have been organizing review of exclusion measures by independent courts, more than 
often this judicial review does not extend to the merits of the case but is limited to the 
legality of the ruling by the lower reviewer. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the 
review never goes beyond the statutory criteria for admission and exclusion. Apart from 
outright racist and discriminatory criteria, the actual content of the statutory conditions for 
exclusion issued by the legislator cannot be challenged. In fact, nothing prevents the 
legislator to issue a full immigration stop.  
 
2. The Cause: Inherent Sovereign Power and Carl Schmitt’s 
Exclusion Thesis 
 
It is crucial to see that this administrative and legal practice is rendered possible mainly by a 
particular rule of international and domestic positive law (hereafter: the rule of inherent 
sovereign power): states have the legal power inherent in sovereignty to admit or exclude 
aliens as they deem fit (subject to international obligations, e.g. admission of refugees, 
protection of family life). The problem with this rule is not that states have the power to 
exclude aliens, but rather that they have the power to do this as they deem fit.5 What can 
make the exclusion of aliens so special that it is beyond justification?6 Arguably, the only 
thesis that can produce such special status is an argument to the effect that the exclusion of 
aliens is somehow essential or inevitably necessary. Any thesis that makes a weaker 
argument will already allow the justification process to get started. Probably the most 
explicit and elaborate argument in this sense has been advanced by Carl Schmitt.7 Though 
                                            
5 In this respect, most contributors in this issue already go beyond the legal framework by providing 
us with arguments or justifications for a particular level of openness or closure; porous borders (Arash 
Abizadeh), fairly open borders (Rainer Bauböck), cosmopolitan citizenship (Rafaelle Marchetti), 
fundamental human right to entry (Phillip Cole). See also footnote 17. 
6 This question is directly related to the much more familiar paradox of admission and/or membership 
rules of a community: who should be included when deciding who is to be excluded? See, for 
instance, a formulation of this problem from the perspective of consent theory: COLE, at 186-187, and 
from the perspective of discourse theory: BENHABIB, at 15. See also Blake’s observation in this issue 
that the focus on the ‘rules for membership’ rather than the ‘rules applicable to members’ make the 
theoretical discussion so problematic. 
7 It is Hans Lindahl’s excellent re-mobilization of Carl Schmitt’s theory in connection to immigration 
that first brought Schmitt’s relevance to my attention. Hans Lindahl Jus Includendi et Excludendi: 
Europe and the Borders of Freedom, Security and Justice, 16 THE KING’S COLLEGE LAW JOURNAL 1 
234-247 (2005). For the rest, I relied primarily on Carl Schmitt’s DER NOMOS DER ERDE IM 
VOELKERRECHT DES JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (1950) and HET BEGRIP POLITIEK (B. Kerkhof and 
G. Kwaad trans., 2001) (1963). For analyses and interpretations of Schmitt’s theory I used the 
following studies: TH. DE WIT, DE ONONTKOOMBAARHEID VAN DE POLITIEK. DE SOUVEREINE VIJAND 
IN DE POLITIEKE FILOSOFIE VAN CARL SCHMITT (1992); D. DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY. 
CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997); Jozef Van Bellingen, 
Politiek en Historiciteit bij Carl Schmitt, 10 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR DE STUDIE VAN DE VERLICHTING EN 
VAN HET VRIJE DENKEN 253 (1982).  
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Schmitt did not address immigration specifically he has rendered explicit a central but deeply 
flawed assumption (hereafter: the exclusion thesis): exclusion is prior to and constitutive of 
to a political and legal order. This assumption underpins the rule of inherent sovereign power 
and is also echoed in the neo-Hobbesian and communitarian accounts of migration. Even 
leading progressive scholars believe that Schmitt revealed a sound assumption that presents 
them with a true dilemma which liberal theorists have to address.8 The exclusion thesis 
roughly goes as follows: i. prior to the political and legal order there is no standard for 
justification; ii. to create a legal order it must be determined what and who is included in the 
order9; iii. inclusion is prior to and constitutive of a legal and political order; iv. inclusion 
implies exclusion, and exclusion co-determines what is included; v. exclusion is also prior to 
and constitutive of a legal and political order. It follows that exclusion is necessary for the 
creation and continuation of a political order (because it is constitutive). In addition, since 
the exclusion is prior to the legal order, there is ultimately10 no standard for justifying (or 
criticizing) the exclusion. What does this mean for the rule of inherent sovereign power and 
(immigration) law? First, it establishes that states are necessarily free to decide at will who 
to include and exclude. In effect, the expression of the sovereign will is ultimately an act of 
inclusion and exclusion. If states were not free to decide at will who to exclude they would 
be subjected to a standard, i.e. a standard beyond the sovereign will. Yet standards only exist 
if there is an order in the first place. And this order is only possible thanks to an act of 
exclusion, which is in itself beyond justification.11 Second, the exclusion thesis establishes 
why exclusion is also necessary for the preservation of the order. Unwanted immigration can 
challenge the actual grounds for the exclusion beyond the initial exclusion. But since the 
state cannot justify this initial exclusion, unwanted immigration is challenging the order 
itself. Hence, the authorities have the duty to fend off immigration (by all means) in order to 
restore the order.  
 
3. Refutation of the Exclusion Thesis and the Rule of Inherent 
Sovereign Power 
 
The exclusion thesis is conceptually flawed. Firstly, it is possible to include (and establish a 
community or order) without excluding. ‘We, the People’ may mean White Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants (WASPs) only; and then the inclusion is combined with exclusion. Alternatively 
‘We, the People’ may mean at least WASPs are included; here no prior and constitutive 
exclusion has taken place. Secondly, exclusion involves an intentional act. The mere fact of 
not being in a place or not having access to a place does not mean that one is excluded. 
Hence, if you are not included in a place it does not necessarily mean that you are excluded. 
                                            
8 E.g. Chantal Mouffe and contributors in THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT (Chantal Mouffe ed., 
1999); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION ( K. Attell trans., 2005).   
9 For Schmitt the quintessential act of inclusion is an actual and physical taking of land (Landnahme). 
I cannot elaborate here on Schmitt’s focus on territoriality. 
10 By contrast, there is a justification standard applicable to subsequent exclusions, namely the initial 
exclusion. 
11 Cf. the principle of state liberty: ‘ce qui n’est pas interdit, est permis’. (The Case of the S.S. "Lotus" 
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sep. 7). 
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Thirdly, reliance on exclusion is also problematic for it often refers to the notion of 
‘everything’ or ‘all things’. Consider the following exclusionary statement: “Only x is 
included and therefore all things but x are excluded.12 So, everything that is not-x is 
excluded.” If the object of exclusion is ‘everything or anything (but x)’ – as opposed to 
something- the exclusion becomes meaningless or at least useless for purposes of practical 
knowledge. To be practical, i.e. to constitute a reason for action, it must still be specified 
what is at least included in the ‘everything’: if not our actions will depend on a full 
knowledge of the ‘everything’ (universe?). In other words, what is excluded cannot be 
derived from what is included. The exclusion thesis is also empirically flawed. The practice 
of international law and legal pluralism simply disproves that the legal order can be traced 
back to (or reconfirmed as) an initial act of exclusion as expressed by the sovereign will (of 
the nation, prince, or what have you). Furthermore, there is hardly any evidence of a 
connection between the exclusion of aliens and the creation of a legal and political order. 
Firstly, comprehensive and effective immigration laws are a very recent phenomenon. This 
would imply that legal orders are an equally recent phenomenon which is absurd. Secondly, 
contrary to common belief, the reasons behind immigration restrictions have rarely been the 
creation of a distinctive legal community.13 Thirdly, a legal order comprises particular 
substantive legal liberties, rights and duties; immigration laws do not establish any of these. 
It follows from the conceptual and empirical objections that exclusion is not ‘essential’ or 
‘inevitably necessary’. The structure of a legal order and sovereignty simply cannot account 
for exclusion being beyond justification. Hence, we must reject the rule of inherent sovereign 
power, not for the sake of morality or benevolence, but as a matter of the structure of law. 
 
II. SECOND EXAMPLE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT: AUTHORITY OF LAW AND 
IMMIGRATION LAWS 
 
Both officials and aliens are norm subjects of immigration laws: aliens must obey the 
immigration laws. But the legal community considers the alien as a norm subject only for 
purposes of excluding him from that same community.14 From the perspective of 
contemporary legal theory – especially an extended reading of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the 
authority of law – this is highly problematic. It may withhold immigration laws the status of 
law vis-à-vis the alien. The argument goes as follows.15  
 
1. The law claims obedience. Law is (inter alia) a matter of practical reasoning. Legal 
directives are special reasons, namely protected reasons: they contain an exclusionary reason 
                                            
12 Of course, the previous objection already showed that this need not follow. 
13 JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT. SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE 
(2000). 
14 Cf. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998). 
15 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW. ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); Joseph Raz, 
Authority, Law and Morality, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND 
POLITICS 194 (1994). Using Raz for applied legal theory requires serious health warnings. Probably 
most importantly, Raz aims at understanding the law, while I am conceptually validating a particular 
area of the law. 
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not to consider other reasons for purposes of assessing what to do. The legal directive claims 
to constitute a sufficient and exhaustive reason for action: the law claims general obedience 
from its norm subjects because it is the law.  
 
2. In order to claim obedience, the law must claim legitimate authority. The law can only 
make this claim if it purports to have legitimate authority. Legitimate authority means that 
the law is in fact a sufficient and exhaustive reason for action.  
 
3. In order to have legitimate authority the law must fulfill the normal justification condition. 
Legitimate authority is subject to normative and non-normative conditions. The most 
important normative condition is normal justification: the norm subject does normally a 
better job of complying with reasons that apply to him directly, if he obeys the law.  
 
4. Most legal systems have only de facto authority. Most, if not all, legal systems cannot 
satisfy the conditions for having legitimate authority. At the very best, they have legitimate 
authority in some areas of the law regarding some people. But more often, legal systems 
have only de facto authority: i.e. some norm subjects regard the legal authority as having 
legitimate authority. Still, de facto authority relies on the notion of legitimate authority and 
thus on normal justification. 
 
5. In order to have de facto authority, the law must have the capacity to have legitimate 
authority. While the legal system may not satisfy the conditions of legitimate authority, it 
must at least have the capacity to have legitimate authority (in order to count as law). It must 
come close to having legitimate authority, i.e. close to satisfying the normal justification 
condition.16  
 
6. In order to have the capacity to have authority, the law must at the least consider the 
relevant reasons applicable to the norm subject. Though a legal directive may be wrong vis-
à-vis a norm subject, it must at the least reflect the legal authorities’ judgment on the reasons 
that apply to the norm subject. And even failure to do so need not disqualify the directive as 
long as there are reasons to obey the law provided by other areas of the law.  
 
7. Immigration laws do not consider the reasons applicable to aliens: immigration laws lack 
the capacity to claim legitimate authority. Immigration laws do not reflect a judgment on the 
reasons applicable to the aliens. In addition, other areas of the law cannot provide sufficient 
reasons to obey the law either; the whole point of immigration laws is to exclude the 
excluded alien from all other areas of the law. So immigration laws fail to come close to 
satisfying the normal justification condition because they take away any reasons for 
respecting the law. Hence, immigration laws cannot count as law vis-à-vis aliens. This leaves 
legal authorities with three options, of which only the last is plausible. First, they simply do 
nothing and betray their own legal system. Second, they cease to treat the alien as a norm 
subject, and transform him into a legal object (like animals or plants). But this compromises 
their contemporary political culture that since the abolition of slavery ceased to treat humans 
                                            
16 It is my own reading that the capacity to have legitimate authority also means coming close to 
satisfying the normal justification condition. 
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as legal objects. Third, they change their laws to the effect of seriously considering the 
reasons applicable to the alien. 
 
III. ARGUMENT FROM POLITICAL THEORY: GIVE EFFECTIVE VOICE TO 
ALIENS 
 
1. Ethics of Migration and General Admission as the Default Position 
 
All political theorists agree that immigration restrictions must be justified.17 But instead of 
raising the question about how this justification can take place, they try to find out what 
makes a good justification for admitting or excluding aliens. Yet their arguments can only 
establish whether there are normally stronger reasons to admit aliens or to exclude them. 
However, in principle we are interested in what is just or right, not in what is normally just. 
Only if it is impossible, inefficient or unjust to establish with certainty what is right to do we 
revert to a normal case. The normal case is then the starting point for determining what we 
ought to do: we need less proof and justification for adopting the normal position than for the 
exception. The normal case is informed by either statistical regularity or ethics, i.e. the 
balancing of practical reasons. This is precisely what political theorists have been doing: 
balancing ex ante and in general the reasons for admission and exclusion of aliens. And from 
the pluralistic approach that considers all types of practical reasons (moral, political, 
prudential, and realistic) it follows that the general admission of aliens has the strongest 
case.18 So there are good reasons for changing the default framework in favor of the alien: 
aliens should normally be admitted and states have the burden of proving the exception, i.e. 
exclusion.  
 
2. The Default Position and Effective Voice 
 
The default position will give the alien voice that enables him to challenge and negotiate 
admission policies, provided that the framework is effective. And here lies another task for 
political and legal theorists: propose institutional arrangements that render the new default 
position effective. To get us started I outline some guiding principles. Firstly, theorists 
should build on our experience with involving disenfranchised persons in other areas of 
public life (e.g. multi-level politics, participatory technology assessment, civil rights 
movement, etc.). They should also consider existing proposals on new immigration policies 
as real institutional options rather than academic exercises19, e.g. for Europe: People Flow. 
Managing Migration in a New European Commonwealth (2003)20; Draft Directive on 
                                            
17 Tholen, at 334. 
18 For arguments and extensive references see especially supra Bader and COLE. 
19 In this respect, we look forward to examining Marchetti’s forthcoming study “Globally Agreed 
Freedom of Movement: Toward a World Migratory Regime”, as cited in his contribution in this issue.  
20 By THEO VEENKAMP ET AL. 
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Minimum Guarantees for Individual Freedom, Security and Justice in Relation to Decisions 
Regarding Movement of Persons by the Meijer’s Committee (2005)21. Secondly, though 
immigration is an international phenomenon, theorists should not be emphatic about 
international solutions. Most immigration restrictions are still national or regional. While 
international standards certainly help, the national roll out is paramount. International 
solutions easily become a pretext for inertia. Thirdly, as social phenomena and the effect of 
public policies are unpredictable, it is an illusion to produce stable and comprehensive 
institutional arrangements. Launch and learn is the proper attitude. We must not fear failure: 
probably from the alien’s perspective we cannot do much worse. Finally, the effectiveness of 
the institutional arrangement matters, not its particular legal status. There are various legal 
vehicles available to shape the default position (e.g. individual or group rights, procedural 
and material rights, legal liberties, official leniency or tolerance, constitutional rights, 
fundamental human rights). Lawyers should explain the theoretical and practical differences. 
But we should not be emphatic about a particular vehicle in the abstract: its effectiveness can 
only be gauged after implementation. This is another reason to get started. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the last twenty years theorists have adequately elaborated the main arguments from the 
ethics of migration. Yet two important things were left unattended. First, the legal status of 
the so-called rule of inherent sovereign power has remained practically unchallenged. 
Second, few, if any, suggestions have been made to the effect of giving the alien voice to 
challenge the justifications of admission policies. As a result it has become far too easy for 
officials to refrain from making any improvements in our admission laws. This article has 
shown that we can do better. There are legal arguments against the rule of inherent sovereign 
power. Furthermore, political theories provide us with very good reasons to change the 
default position and give voice to aliens. And we, theorists, can make this voice effective if 
we start proposing concrete institutional arrangements, today rather than tomorrow. 
                                            
21 By Pieter Boeles et al. in 7 E.J.I.L. 301 (2005). 
